Washington built its trade war to contain China. Nearly two years on, the tariffs have failed to break China’s manufacturing momentum while pushing a growing share of the cost onto American households.
By Richard Adeolu Adejumobi | TMN Economy & Technology Policy Desk
For nearly two years, the economic architecture of President Donald Trump’s second administration has rested on a straightforward proposition: impose tariffs on foreign goods, force trading partners to concede, bring manufacturing back to American soil and make the United States “rich again.”
It is an attractive political proposition. It is also one that deserves to be judged by outcomes rather than slogans.
The evidence available by August 2026 presents a more complicated—and increasingly uncomfortable—picture.
China’s manufacturing machine has not been dismantled. Chinese exporters have adapted, redirected markets and continued expanding their presence in several strategic industries. Meanwhile, American businesses and consumers have absorbed a substantial share of the cost of the tariffs.
The tariff wall, in other words, has not made the foreigner pay the entire bill.
Americans are paying too.
A Trade Policy Built on Legal Reinvention
The instability of the policy itself tells part of the story.
In February 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 6–3 in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act did not give the president authority to impose tariffs. The ruling invalidated the administration’s sweeping reciprocal tariffs and fentanyl-related duties imposed on Canada, Mexico and China.
The administration did not abandon the tariff strategy.
Instead, it moved to Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, imposing a roughly 10 percent global tariff. When the statutory 150-day window expired on July 24, Washington shifted again, this time invoking Section 301 to impose new duties of between 10 and 12.5 percent on dozens of trading partners.
Meanwhile, Section 232 tariffs on strategic commodities—including steel, aluminium, copper and semiconductors—remain in place, alongside additional duties on selected Canadian goods and pharmaceuticals.
The pattern is difficult to miss: whenever one legal route closes, another is found.
That may be legally defensible depending on the authority invoked. But it creates a broader economic problem: businesses cannot plan confidently when the cost of importing, sourcing and investing can change with each new executive order, court ruling or statutory interpretation.
Trade policy is supposed to create strategic leverage.
It should not create permanent uncertainty.
The Bill Is Reaching the Household
The most important question is ultimately not how much tariff revenue Washington collects.
It is who pays for it.
The answer is increasingly visible in household budgets.
According to estimates cited in the source material, the Tax Foundation calculated that tariffs cost the average American household approximately $1,000 in 2025, with another $900 expected in 2026. The Yale Budget Lab estimated that the tariff regime raised consumer prices by roughly 1.3 percent in the short term, equivalent to a significant annual loss in household purchasing power.
The Joint Economic Committee’s Democratic minority staff estimated the national consumer cost even higher, at more than $231 billion in 2025.
The precise estimate varies by methodology, but the direction is remarkably consistent.
Tariffs are increasing costs.
Businesses initially absorbed part of the burden by drawing down inventories and accepting lower margins. But as those buffers disappear and contracts are renegotiated, more of the cost is being transferred to consumers.
This is particularly significant because tariffs function like a regressive tax.
A wealthy household can absorb a higher price for an imported appliance or vehicle without radically altering its consumption. A low-income family cannot so easily absorb higher prices for clothing, footwear, household goods or food.
The tariff therefore does not merely raise prices.
It redistributes purchasing power.
The China Problem Has Not Gone Away
The strongest argument for Trump’s tariff strategy is that China represents an extraordinary industrial and geopolitical challenge.
That argument should not be dismissed.
China’s state-supported manufacturing ecosystem has created enormous competitive pressure on American industries, particularly in electric vehicles, batteries, solar technology, electronics and other strategic sectors.
But tariffs have yet to demonstrate that they can reverse China’s manufacturing dominance on their own.
Evidence cited in the source material indicates that Chinese companies have continued expanding their global market share across numerous product categories despite higher barriers in Western markets.
Instead of disappearing, Chinese production has increasingly been redirected toward Southeast Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.
This is an important distinction.
A tariff can prevent a Chinese product from entering the United States at the same volume.
It cannot necessarily prevent that product from being manufactured.
And it certainly cannot stop Chinese companies from looking for another customer.
China Is Rerouting, Not Retreating
The scale of China’s industrial capacity makes this particularly important.
China now accounts for roughly three-quarters of global electric-vehicle production and around 40 percent of global EV exports. Its major battery manufacturers, including CATL and BYD, command more than half of the global battery market, while Chinese firms account for more than 90 percent of solar-module production.
These numbers point to a strategic reality Washington cannot tariff away easily.
China has built industrial ecosystems—not merely individual export products.
If access to one market becomes more difficult, producers can redirect capacity elsewhere.
That is precisely what appears to be happening.
The consequence is that American tariffs may be changing where Chinese goods are sold more effectively than they are changing where Chinese goods are made.
That distinction matters enormously.
The American Manufacturing Promise
None of this means that protecting American industry is inherently wrong.
There are legitimate national-security reasons for protecting strategic supply chains. There are also legitimate concerns about industrial subsidies, forced technology transfer, intellectual-property practices and America’s dependence on foreign production for critical technologies.
The question is whether tariffs are the most effective instrument for achieving those objectives.
A durable manufacturing revival requires more than making foreign goods expensive.
It requires competitive energy costs, skilled workers, reliable infrastructure, advanced research, affordable capital, efficient logistics and long-term industrial policy.
If tariffs raise the price of imported machinery, components and raw materials used by American manufacturers, they can actually make domestic production more expensive.
That is the contradiction at the centre of the strategy.
A country cannot manufacture its way to competitiveness by making the inputs required for manufacturing permanently more expensive.
The Trade Deficit Test
The administration’s argument also faces a difficult empirical test.
Despite the tariff offensive, the U.S. goods trade deficit reached record levels in 2025.
That does not mean tariffs are incapable of reducing particular bilateral deficits or changing individual supply chains. It does mean that the broader promise of using tariffs to fundamentally rebalance America’s external trade has not yet been demonstrated.
Trade deficits are driven by deeper forces—including savings, investment, fiscal policy, consumption and exchange rates.
They cannot be permanently corrected simply by taxing imports.
This is where political rhetoric collides with economic complexity.
And Africa Is Watching
For Nigeria and the wider Global South, this is not merely an American domestic debate.
The redirection of Chinese industrial capacity is already creating opportunities and risks for African economies.
Cheaper Chinese electric vehicles, solar panels, batteries and industrial equipment could accelerate Africa’s energy transition and infrastructure development.
But the same phenomenon could overwhelm fragile domestic manufacturing sectors if African economies become dumping grounds for subsidised surplus production.
African exporters face another problem: expanding U.S. tariff barriers can restrict access to one of the world’s largest consumer markets at precisely the moment African countries are trying to diversify beyond raw commodities.
Nigeria, in particular, cannot afford to watch these developments passively.
The country needs a trade strategy that protects legitimate domestic production without insulating inefficient industries indefinitely. It must also use the African Continental Free Trade Area to build regional markets capable of absorbing locally manufactured goods.
The Deeper Lesson
There is an enduring economic truth behind all the legal manoeuvring and political slogans:
Tariffs are taxes on imports.
Foreign producers may absorb some of the cost through lower margins or reduced prices. Businesses may temporarily absorb another portion. But a significant share can ultimately find its way into consumer prices.
Calling the tariff a national-security measure does not change its economic incidence.
Calling it a negotiating weapon does not eliminate its domestic cost.
And calling it a tax on China does not make American consumers immune from the bill.
The real measure of success should therefore be straightforward.
Are American households better off?
Are American factories becoming more productive?
Are strategically important supply chains returning to the United States?
Is American manufacturing creating sustainable, competitive employment?
And has China’s industrial dominance actually been weakened?
If the answer to those questions remains mixed, Washington should be willing to adjust course.
Trade Wars Need an Exit Strategy
There is nothing inherently wrong with confronting China’s industrial practices.
But confrontation should have a destination.
Tariffs should be part of a coherent industrial and trade strategy—not a permanent economic weapon whose rates rise whenever political pressure demands a response.
America needs predictable trade rules, targeted protection for genuinely strategic industries, investment in domestic productive capacity, stronger alliances and negotiations that produce measurable concessions.
What it does not need is an endless tariff cycle in which businesses cannot predict their costs, consumers absorb higher prices and trading partners simply find new markets.
The United States entered this experiment promising that foreigners would pay for America’s economic revival.
Nearly two years later, the evidence suggests something more complicated.
The tariff wall may be facing outward. But part of the bill is coming back home.
And that is the question Washington can no longer avoid: if the objective is to make America richer, how long can a policy that makes Americans pay more be called a success?
Source note: This editorial draws on the supplied TMN research document, which cites the Tax Foundation, Yale Budget Lab, Goldman Sachs research, the Joint Economic Committee, Nikkei Asia, Oxford Economics, CFR/Morning Consult and Harris/Guardian polling, with figures current as of August 2026.